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Central Europe at the turn of the sixteenth century may best be understood as a 
collection of three supra-national polities: the Hungarian Kingdom, the Polish-
Lithuanian Confederation and the Empire of the German Nation.
1
 None of these 
Empires survived the early modern period. The kingdom of Hungary was shattered by 
the Turkish victory at Mohács in 1526. Poland saw troops from Sweden and 
Brandenburg in Warsaw as early as 1656. Though Poland recovered afterwards, the 
Polish sejm came under the influence of noble factions paid from Moscow, Vienna 
and Berlin in the 1730s if not earlier. Movements to restore independence led to the 
first (1772) and second (1793) partitions of Poland and ultimately to the complete 
dissolution of a sovereign Polish state. The invasion and conquest of areas of the 
Empire of the German Nation by armies of the French Republic after 1793 led to the 
redistribution of the lands of the imperial Catholic church among more powerful 
dynasties, primarily in Prussia, Austria, Württemberg, Bavaria and Baden (in the 
Reichsdeputationshauptschluss of 1803), to alliances of most of them with Napoleon 
and to the dissolution of the empire in 1804-1806.        
 These facts have led many historians to conclude that the nation inevitably 
needed a strong centralized monarchy in order for it to survive in the highly predatory 
and competitive environment of early modern Europe. Reflections on the alleged 
corruption of the Swedish and Polish diet supported this conclusion.  Such ideas, 
however, have a longer pedigree, for European reflections on the nature of politics 
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and government in the turmoil of war and crisis go back to Machiavelli and the 
breakdown of the Italian city-state system following the French invasion of the 1490s. 
Arguably, bloodshed in the sixteenth and seventeenth century encouraged further 
reflection on the ―reason of state‖ by European princes, who attempted to patch 
together lands to assemble ―dynastic agglomerations.‖2 Since the nineteenth century, 
these agglomerations were (mis-) understood as the kernel of the nation state. During 
the nineteenth century, even important ―Whig‖ historians like Thomas Babington 
Macauley addressed the ―Prussian Monarchy‖ as ―the youngest of the European 
states.‖3 Along this line, the territorial state within the Empire provided Protestant 
historians with the functional equivalent of the centralized national governments of 
France or England, Sweden or Portugal, while Catholic historians tended to 
emphasize the dissolution of the Empire.
4
 To both, however, cuius regio, eius religio 
was the factual and legal watershed between a disintegrated and chaotic late medieval 
Empire and the ―well-ordered police state,‖ as Marc Raeff described it, of the later 
sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Peace of Augsburg of 1555 
allegedly gave princes the right to determine confessional allegiance. They gained 
power over the church in their lands. This bolstered their rights and their authority and 
helped them consolidate their power in a system of territorial absolutism. According 
to this argument this critical transfer occurred by 1555.
5
 Leonard Krieger‘s famous 
―German Idea of Freedom,‖ outlining a German Sonderweg of passive and inner 
freedom of conscience as opposed to active participatory liberty, is rooted in this 
notion.
6
   
In his widely praised study on Luther, Roland Bainton reminds the reader that 
Luther in his 1523 On Secular Authority states that belief is a ―free work‖ (freies 
Werk um den Glauben) that should not be enforced, and that secular authority should 
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leave subjects to believe as they ―can and will‖ (so oder so glauben lassen, wie man 
kann und will). Indeed, the limits of what secular authority should enforce is the focus 
of this treatise.
7
 During the eighteenth century, enlightened Lutherans attempted to 
project their notion of tolerance back in time onto Luther, claiming the great man for 
their own cause and taking him away from their orthodox foes.
8
 In 1625 Christoph 
Besold, the towering legal authority of Lutheran Germany, referred in his De iure 
maiestate to Luther and to Johann Gerhard, the ―father‖ of Lutheran orthodoxy, to 
assert the following point:  it displeases God when we desire to make others pious (Es 
gefälle Gott nicht, wenn wir ander Leut begehren fromm zu machen).  Besold 
additionally asserted that the law of nature gives every subject the right to a free 
conscience and to believe whatever he wants (Juris naturalis est, conscientiam 
liberam habere, & credere quicquid velis).
9
  By the same token, Besold reminded his 
readers of Luther‘s earlier writings on the Jews where he advised against violence. 
Besold quoted Luther with his reminder that Christ was a Jew, and that if the 
Apostles, who also had been Jews, had treated us, the pagans, as we treat the Jews 
today, no pagan would ever have become Christian.
10
  
 Besold was not an outsider but a seven-time rector of the University of 
Tübingen and one of the most frequently cited authorities on law and politics from the 
1620s to the 1650s.
11
 Indeed, during the later 1640s and early 1650s, Hessian 
noblemen suing their prince at the Imperial Chamber Court frequently referred to 
Besold in their depositions. As should be obvious from these citations, how 
individuals perceived the territorial state was not uniform in this period. To start, its 
formation was in no way complete by 1555. Rather, from the middle of the sixteenth 
century juridical conflicts and academic treatises about what had actually been 
achieved with the Peace of Augsburg began to shape the meaning of what was to 
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become the territorial state, a process brought to a closure in 1648 only in some 
respects.  The struggles between princes and estates in places such as Hesse, 
Mecklenburg, Württemberg or Calenberg over the precise extent of the rights and 
privileges of princes, estates and subjects carried on well beyond Westphalia.
 12
  In 
particular the last twenty years have considerably changed our views on the timing 
and meaning of the formula, cuius regio, eius religio.  Scholars still debate the 
meaning of the terms regio and religio and the relationships between faith, confession 
and secular power groups.  
 After reviewing some results of recent historiography on the timing and nature 
of territorial state-building, I will then present new insights into the variety of 
contemporary legal and political expertise on the issue, focusing on the meaning of 
terms like regio or patria in the course of the sixteenth century and on the treatment 
of princely rule in political thought during the first third of the seventeenth century.  
In conclusion I argue that the emerging concept of the res publica as legal person of 
public order within the Empire did by no means enshrine territorial absolutism but a 
highly ambivalent system of rule in which princes and their exercise of power were 
meant to remain constrained by legal boundaries enforceable at courts of law.  
 
Territorial State-building:  Recent Historiography 
Neither the reformation of the princes
13
 nor the Peace of Westphalia are understood 
today as a watershed of territorial absolutism. A revision of the older narrative 
concerning the Empire and territorial states depends upon four points. Support for 
three of them has been provided by the explosion of detailed monographic research 
during the last 30 years, led primarily by Karl Otmar von Aretin, Thomas Brady, 
Heinz Duchhardt, Peter Moraw, Volker Press, Heinz Schilling, Georg Schmidt and 
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Eike Wolgast.
14
 The fourth point is the subject of research at the interface of the 
history of political thought and social history, conducted, among others, by myself in 
cooperation with legal historians.
15
 Regarding the first three points, the Empire was 
not disintegrating—neither around 1500, nor in 1555 nor even in 1648; territories 
were built, but in conjunction with the Empire and in subjection to it; and the building 
of territories was only completed during the period between the eventual dissolution 
of the Empire in 1804–06 and the reordering of Central Europe‘s borders in 1814–15. 
The restructuring of legal relations between the emperor, princes and vassals was 
pursued during the later sixteenth and seventeenth century within the legal framework 
of the Empire, not independent of it. Thus, the consolidation of princely territories 
remained stretched across the whole early modern period and was accompanied by 
initiatives from subjects and vassals to secure their own privileges by seeking support 
from imperial courts or neighboring princes. As for the fourth point, this dynamic was 
also influenced by changes in political thought that in turn informed the way the law 
was interpreted and applied. Let us consider these issues in turn. 
 Recent accounts underline the independence of late medieval Central European 
dynasties and corporations.
16
 At the beginning of our period, the Empire was not 
primarily a constitutional unity, but a mixed political system, comprising princely 
dynasties, regional associations of cities and nobilities and the Imperial Church. It 
could be variously conceived in three overlapping yet different senses. It still claimed 
the transferral of the plenitudo potestatis from the late Roman Empire (translatio 
imperii). Second, the Empire laid claim to fiefs not only in the regnum teutonicum, 
but also for instance in upper Italy, Burgundy, Savoy and Lotharingia 
(Reichslehensverband), the elected king and Emperor remaining the feudal lord 
(Reichslehensherr).
 
Third, beginning in the fifteenth century there was a growing 
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sense, mainly in the regnum teutonicum, the eventual center of imperial reforms, of 
being the patria communis of the German Nation, governed by common institutions, 
laws and procedures rather than by a single dynasty or an aristocracy of princes.  
 Right into the fifteenth century, the Empire in this latter sense was well 
understood to be composed of divergent areas, but these were not meant to be 
principalities, but historic regions. A document of 1422 enumerates German lands 
(deutsche lande) as lying in ―Swabia, Bavaria, at the Rhine, in Alsatia, in the 
Wetterau, in Hesse, Thuringia, Saxonia, Maissen, Brabant, Holland, Zealand, 
Gelderen‖ and so forth.17 Neither these older lands nor the jurisdictional districts 
(Reichskreise) of Imperial Reform from 1495 were the terrae of the princes. 
 But the terrae that princes did possess as fiefs were not understood as spatially 
defined areas, either. The varieties of dynastic demography and high medieval 
developments had provided for huge differences in the extension of princely fiefs.
18
 
Princely fiefs established a mutual bond of responsibilities and duties among the 
Roman king, (dominus) and the prince (vasallus) for the term of a natural life. They 
needed to be reinvested and allowed for subinfeudation, creating a complex web of 
lord and vassal relationships.
19
 Enfeoffment, although it did concern a principality, 
did not define a precise geographical area or legal district; rather, it granted certain 
general rights that the respective prince had to shape into practical politics in manifold 
ways. The increasing institutionalization of late medieval princely government, of 
councils and offices for finance, of the administration of the demesne, of taxing 
peasant and urban subject populations, of the negotiations with vassals consolidating 
themselves into a recognizable group as estates during the fifteenth century, all of that 
gave sharper contours to princely rule. It did not consolidate princely fiefs into 
spatially defined legal districts. Recent research confirms that by 1500, the small 
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administrative and legal districts of Ämter, often consisting of a small town and 
several villages, had achieved a relatively continuous and clear-cut spatial shape. But 
the princely fiefs themselves were by no means organized into such Ämter; rather they 
consisted of them—and of the towns and noble families beginning to form the 
territorial estates.
 20
 
 Consequently, the period from the late fifteenth to the mid-seventeenth century 
has been re-conceptualized as the making of the German Empire—in particular in terms 
of the implementation of the reforms of 1495 involving the Diet, an Imperial Chamber 
court and administrative districts— in conjunction with the consolidation of dynastic 
territorial possessions from a diverse number of corporations, families and allegiances, 
rather than the emergence of the territorial state from imperial ruins.
21
 In this manner, 
early modern German historiography is now being rewritten in terms of evolving 
political, social and cultural relations in the German-speaking parts of Central Europe 
which increasingly began to reorganize themselves as part of a meaningful political 
unity and a jurisdictional legal entity. Owing to the fragile relations of power and rights 
in the Empire, neither the Emperor nor the princes could dictate the shape of the 
evolving political entity of the Empire and the territories within them or their relations 
to each other. Because the consolidation of public power within the Empire remained in 
such flux during the early modern period, both within the Empire as a whole and within 
the evolving territories of princes, individuals and groups kept being forced to adapt 
their own claims for status—and thus public power—according to changing events and 
to changing notions of legitimacy. 
 Even by the later seventeenth century, families like the von Alvensleben, 
though legally vassals to the electors of Brandenburg, decided independently on 
appointing Reformed or Lutheran ministers to their parishes and had their own 
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network of sub-vassals.
22
 As late as 1729, the nobility of the ecclesiastical electorate of 
Trier could still declare its independence of the prince and become imperial knights. 
The Catholic Emperor could still, with the help of allied Lutheran princes, restore the 
rights of nobility and estates in Mecklenburg against the absolutist policies of its 
territorial duke between 1719 and the 1755. The dukes of Württemberg could not 
enforce absolutism against their estates. If the Empire dissolved into a confederation of 
princely dynasties and their possessions—not territorial states— that happened after 
1740, not before.
23
  
 The enforcement of rule over peasant and urban subjects living within the 
Ämter was by no means at the core of what state-building meant for princes during the 
later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Indeed, focusing on the relations between 
princes and peasant-subjects within these Ämter would miss the development and 
strategic advantage of superioritas territorialis, a term signifying a new approach to 
the relations of princes and their vassals. Those affected by this development were 
primarily the noble vassals of princes and towns that had claimed some kind of right 
to self-administration, in particular with regard to the administration of the church. 
Territorialization was meant to subject these semi-independent groups in particular by 
transforming the myriad constellations of relationships between lord and vassals, 
dependant on specific verifiable rights, into a single all-encompassing subordination. 
With this aim in mind, around the turn of the seventeenth century, several German 
jurists and authors of politicas embraced Jean Bodin‘s thesis that any political unit 
needed a single supreme authority.  Andreas Knichen‘s treatise on territorial rule 
stands out among these works attempting to bring about this interpretative shift.
24
  
 One major incentive behind this change was a desire to shift the balance in 
legal disputes about material burdens among lords, vassals and subjects. Rather than 
 256 
the lord having to prove every single right against vassals and subjects, now subjects 
and vassals were meant to prove exemption from full subjection to subject-status and 
its burdens, including taxes and services, by specific pieces of evidence. Shifting this 
burden appears to be the major strategic advantage that princes‘ lawyers could exploit, 
provided their client possessed this superiority. In some cases, the issue of motivation 
is clear cut. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Landgrave Maurice of 
Hesse-Cassel (1608-1624) claimed the existence of such a spatial district, the 
principality of Hesse, well beyond the range of his rural and urban subjects living in 
the Ämter of his demesne, mainly as tenants of his land, or the vassals holding fiefs 
including subjection in jurisdictional issues from him. He now claimed that the 
neighboring counties of Waldeck and those in the Wetterau were in fact 
geographically part of a single Hessian territory. Thus, their inhabitants were 
necessarily his subjects and the counts of Waldeck and of the Wetterau were his, and 
not imperial, vassals; occasional fifteenth-century enfeoffments were submitted as 
proof of subject status. He also attempted to capture one of the counties by force. But 
given his own limited resources he, like all other princes, relied in general not on 
force alone but on argument before the courts as well.
25
 
 Knichen, however, had not described an accepted legal procedure or a political 
reality ex post facto, but a new legal concept. The new terms—Landesobrigkeit, jus 
territorii, superioritas—and the claims associated with them by princes thus became 
subject to legal and political contests with diverse outcomes. Indeed, these terms were 
themselves products of such strife. Neither cuius regio, eius religio nor ius reformandi 
were formulae to be found in the actual regulations of the 1552 Treaty of Passau or 
the later 1555 Peace of Augsburg. Passau established peace among emperor, king, 
electoral princes, princes and estates of the Empire until a solution to the religious 
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question was found. Similarly, the treaty of Augsburg only mentioned king and 
estates in paragraph 4: Churfürsten, Fürsten und Gemeinen Ständen. Adherents to the 
Augsburg Confession were to be protected under the peace of the land (Landfrieden) 
against attacks arising from their adherence to the Augsburgische Confessions-
Religion…, so sie aufgericht oder nochmals aufrichten möchten.26 The revolutionary 
aspect of this agreement was the attempt to come to terms with religious diversity by 
agreeing on keeping the peace without any definite limitation on the agreement—that 
is, without any strict connection between keeping the peace and an agreement in 
matters of religion. The Peace of Augsburg achieved this by establishing—in 
connection with the Treaty of Passau—that all sequestration of property of the Church 
of Rome by reforming magistrates that had occurred up until August 1552 should now 
also be protected under the agreement for peace. This technical approach achieved a 
compromise between adherents of the different faiths. While force had played and 
continued to play a role in reformations and counterreformations, most reformations 
had been accomplished within a framework of active consultation among theologians, 
estates and citizens. Issues of taxation and recruitment of resources for wars and feuds 
of princes were likewise not regulated by these agreements. Both Passau and 
Augsburg remained traditional in their vocabulary in that the parties involved were by 
no means states or territories, but princes and estates.  
 As Bernd Christian Schneider has recently shown, the formula cuius regio, 
eius religio did not appear in the sources before 1587. By that time, the imperial diet 
had just ruled (in 1582) to link representation at the diet neither to dynastic lineages 
nor to all noblemen given princely dignities by the emperor, but to principalities 
hitherto acknowledged.
27
 Schneider found that legal specialists had to concentrate on 
the problem of who could actually claim the ius reformandi, the right to the activity 
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described in the Augsburg treaty as the aufrichten oder nochmals aufrichten of the 
Augsburg Confession or of Roman Catholicism. Even the precise extent of the group 
addressed in 1555 remained anything but clear. In conflicts about the right to reform, 
for instance between the count of Öttingen and a monastery (1590s) or with regard to 
vassals of one prince with land laying within an area claimed to be the territory of 
another, lawyers and legal scholars had to debate which of the various parties owned 
the ius reformandi and toward whom it could be exercised. They also struggled to 
establish whether the ius reformandi was possibly an outgrowth of some other 
original right or to which other privilege it was related.  At the same time, 
contradictory formulations in Stephanus suggested that religion was connected to 
territory. Schneider argues that increasingly from the early seventeenth century 
onwards, authors like Christoph Besold understood the ius reformandi as part of 
territorial superiority, not least because it could not be understood to be a right 
devolved from the powers of bishops. Bishops plainly could not be considered to have 
the privilege of choosing between two confessions.  By logic, one of these confessions 
had to be heretical. Thus, the ius reformandi must have been connected to another 
realm of legal privilege.  As Schneider points out, authors such as Besold, Carpov and 
Engelbrecht concluded ―what the Stephani Brothers around 1600 did not dare to 
write: that there must be a right of civil authority (obrigkeitliches Kirchenrecht) above 
and beyond the jurisdiction of bishops and its devolution to princes.‖28  
 Thus, in the course of debate and only from the 1620s onward, it became 
unavoidable to assume that the civil authority of territorial superiority had to be the 
source of the right to reform the church. At the same time, princely interest in 
subsuming neighboring but less powerful members of Germany‘s higher nobility still 
subject only to the Emperor led to attempts to interpret specific single legal acts—for 
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instance an enfeoffment or the presence of such a nobleman at an earlier diet—as 
demonstrating their status as subject to the prince in question. In this context 
allegations about ancient fatherlands, when their geographical extension proved the 
extent of territorial rule, played a further role.
29
   
Superioritas territorialis, to be sure, was in itself a new term and had to be 
inferred by the existence of a varying number of existing privileges, such as higher 
jurisdiction, representation at a diet or Vogtei. The ultimate goal of this development 
was to infer from such scattered rights a comprehensive power over church and 
subjects in a defined spatial unit. From the possession of this comprehensive power, 
further individual rights such as taxation and jurisdiction could be derived. Subjected 
to superioritas, subjects had to prove every possible exemption, and even those could 
possibly be overturned by arguing that superioritas involved the right of extralegal 
measures in case of necessity.    
 
Territorial State-building:  Contemporary Legal and Political Developments  
In the course of the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, territories in the Empire not 
only became the main arena of administrative reform and legal change; they also 
developed in the course of the political and legal battles between princes and estates 
distinct constitutional characteristics that distinguished Bavaria from Brandenburg, 
Saxony from Mecklenburg or Trier from Hesse. The gradual accumulation of 
territories was changing the political and legal landscape of the Empire, but it did not 
introduce territorial absolutism wholesale. Rather, each emerging territory acquired its 
own specific ―historic‖ constitution as a result of the varying and shifting relations 
between princes, vassals and subjects and the consequential effect of innumerable 
contracts, decisions, privileges, dynastic house laws and other treaties. The changing 
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relevance of Roman law, the emergence of a historic fundamental and specialized 
public law of the Empire and of the new secular law of nature all left their stamp on 
the arguments made by princes and subjects in their conflicts. Political, constitutional, 
legal and social historians attempted to understand the interrelation of power interests, 
social power resources, political circumstances, and legal and political thought in 
tracing in detail how negotiations between princely dynasties and their estates 
worked, what arguments were used, and what consequences ensued.
30
   
 At the core of German reasoning on public power remained the concept of the 
res publica as the institutional configuration of public order, raised above the society 
of citizens and subjects, and involving supreme power to rule over subjects. This 
development went back at least to Leonardi Bruni, the famous Florentine statesmen, 
who argued in his commentary on Aristotle that the society of citizens needed, to 
acquire permanence, the governing order of the res publica.
31
 The need for rule 
moved into the center of what was understood to be indispensable for a society to live 
together.  In Germany, Philip Melanchthon followed this trend when he, in his 1530 
commentary on Aristotle, defined any polity as a legitimate order in which some 
order, others obey.
32
 By the last fourth of the sixteenth century, Petrus Victorius even 
alleged in his own influential commentary on Aristotle that the existence of and 
unequivocal order of rule and obedience, addressed as res publica, was the single 
most important condition for the existence of any human society.
33
  
 As these developments took place in political thought, legal scholars in 
Germany began to mention the geographical location of a given plaintiff as an issue in 
determining the validity of a claim of rule and to begin to understand the possessions 
of princes as consolidated administrative units under a single rule. Ulrich Zasius 
delineated the Roman origins of feudalism primarily in order to prove that all 
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magistrates, including the Emperor, remained bound by civil laws.
34
 He argued that 
feudal relations had been derived from agreements between patrons and clients within 
Roman society that had been extended to captured and occupied areas.
35
 The relations 
built on this basis, between princes and those receiving a fief, had to be understood as 
contracts enforceable by law.
36
 Only the Roman Emperor - and then every rex in 
regno - could give a fief.
37
 Zasius assumed that dukes in Germany descended from 
military leaders of (late Roman) imperial troops, who had probably been given 
territories by the Emperors to keep them loyal.
38
 In his discussion on controversies 
regarding fiefs, Zasius emphasized the boundaries of a given area and thus linked 
princely power with a legal territorial district rather than simply bundles of varying 
rights. Vassals in such an area have to be assumed to be part of the estates.
39
 
Moreover, legal dictionaries referred to the provinces of the later Roman Empire and 
their heads, the presides provinciarum, to provide an example for this new meaning of 
patria. For example, Johannes Spiegel's Lexicon Iuris Civilis of 1549 cited among the 
listed meanings (significationes) of patria the patria potestas, i.e. the legal power of 
the father over his family. But it also listed patria as provincia, a spatially defined 
area in which all powers and administrative agencies necessary to the upkeep of 
political order (ordinationes politiae), were held by a single magistrate.
40
 The 
influential Marburg lawyer Nicolaus Vigelius organized a further edition of this 
dictionary in 1577. This edition took over the article on patria as provincia from 
1549, but added not only a further reference on the duty of caritas to the patria but 
also a reference to Johannes Oldendorp‘s In Verba Legum XII Tabularem Scholia. 
This work was added to various editions of the dictionary so readers could 
immediately check the reference. Oldendorp's commentary described the office and 
legal rights of various magistrates in Roman law, and in particular the presides 
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provinciarum, the heads of the provinces. These references were included in the later 
edition of the same dictionary, the Lexicon Iuridicum, of 1612.
41
 By that time, 
princes‘ lawyers were beginning to use the terms provincia and patria to indicate the 
late-medieval bundles of jurisdictions and rights held by their employers. These rights 
were seen as expressions of the exclusive, quasi-imperial, jurisdictional and 
administrative powers of princes over anyone living within a spatially defined area 
named by these terms.
42
  
 In the ensuing conflicts between princes and estates and in the scholarly 
literature as well, the emerging territories were thought to bind the supreme 
magistrate, the prince, to specific legal procedures. The underlying understanding of 
relations among princes and the inferior nobilities, and sometimes even citizens, as 
those among lords and enfeoffed vassals was never quite entirely pushed to the 
margins by the political terminology of majesty, territorial superiority and subject-
hood. The increasing weight of the assumption of ius superioritatis of the imperial 
estates over a more or less ill-defined group of subjects and vassals did shape the 
nature of interrelated hierarchies within the Empire, but it did not change it radically 
in favor of territorial absolutism. Some major legal scholars, like Tobias Paurmeister, 
while maintaining the limits of imperial power, insisted that everyone physically in a 
territory must also be subject to the prince enfeoffed with the principality of this 
geographic region.
43
 Christoph Besold, however, distinguished between in territorium 
and de territorio.
44
 Moreover, some authors were accused of being ―German 
monarchomachs.‖ One of them, Johannes Althusius, was explicitly attacked with this 
term by Henning Arnisaeus, the major proponent of territorial absolutism.
45
 These 
authors held not only that princes should rule according to the written laws, statutes, 
contracts and the Herkommen, but that specific groups among the subjects and vassals 
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of the prince could enforce princely compliance with the laws. Horst Dreitzel listed 
around a dozen German authors under this term, and one might add a few more. 
Among them were Lutheran legal scholars such as Friedrich Pruckmann, Heinrich 
Bruning, Valentin Forster, Bartholomaeus Volcmarus, and Jakob Multz; Lutheran 
theologians like Johann Gerhard and Jacob Fabricius; Reformed theologians like 
David Pareus; Lutheran authors of politicas like Reinhard Koenig and Christian 
Liebenthal and Reformed writers of politicas like Hermann Kirchner and Johannes 
Althusius.
46
 The date of their publications ranged from Mathias Cuno‘s De pactis 
liber in 1590 to Reinhold Condit‘s Repraesentatio majestatis from 1690. 47  
For one example we can turn to Bartholomaeus Volcmar‘s De Iure Principum 
aliorum magistratum synoptica Tractatio (Frankfurt, 1618). Chapter IX dealt with the 
problem of which kind of defence was appropriate against the prince. As did other 
authors, he denounced the killing of the father and any illicit action by the subjects; he 
reminded readers that Luther had warned against any war against Charles V. It 
remained characteristic of these considerations to approach the issue with caution, in 
particular with regard to single subjects. However, Volcmar then reminded his readers 
from Scripture (I Kings 12) and the writings of Bodin and Althusius that the people 
had no obligation to the tyrant—whether the usurper void of title or the tyrant ex 
exercitio. Lord and vassals were obligated to the patria (in this context, it was typical 
to use this term for the territory in question) and beyond the bounds of legality the 
action of princes were seen as null and void (proterea eius decreta nulla sunt).
48
  Self-
defence to secure life and limb was legitimate, the defence of religion even more so 
(multo magis in causa religionis). Volcmar pointed out, quoting Nehemiah 4 and a 
1547 letter from Luther edited by Melanchthon, that the task of correcting and 
defending rested with the ephors. Volcmar thus cited three different kinds of 
Opmerking [HL5]: Do you think this is 
confusing?  Luther of course dies in 1546.  
Might it be better to cite the original date the 
letter was written—not the year Melanchthon 
edited it? 
 264 
resistance—allegiance to the patria, not the prince, the licit defence of one‘s life, and 
the specific privileges of groups in Germany to correct a superior magistrate—that 
had been developed by the 1620s as types frequently referred to, without however any 
clear indication of who these persons might be.
49
 Moreover, some legal scholars 
argued that the law provided for resisting actions of a magistrate threatening not only 
life and limb, but also the goods of the vassal and subject.
50
 Feudal law provided for 
intervention by the emperor or the right to resist by vassals if they were maltreated, 
for that meant that the fief had deteriorated in worth. Thus, Heinrich Rosenthal still 
insisted in his Tractatus synopsis totius iuris feudalis (1610) that while a vassal may 
never injure his lord and dominus (laedere personam domini), he could resist, and so 
could his own sub-vassals (sed aliter ei vel eius subsidiaries resistat) against illegal 
actions of the lord. The vassal could, as long as the body of the lord was not injured, 
confront his lord, in court and otherwise. In the case of an illegal interference of the 
lord into the enfeoffed goods, even injuring the lord in defence remained legitimate.
51
  
 Many of these authors, such as Maulius, Wesenbeck and Rosenthal, were cited 
by Christoph Besold on the connection of the ius reformandi to superioritas 
territorialis. Besold used these as examples for the argument that princes could be 
held accountable to some court of justice.
52
 He himself was careful not to delineate 
how that actually had to be brought about in matters of general principle, but rather 
insisted on the factual legal framework for protecting public rights and private 
goods.
53
  Born in Tübingen in 1577, Besold was raised in the Lutheran household of 
his father, a Tübingen attorney (Hofgerichtsadvokat). He studied at Tübingen, came 
into contact with Kepler and was appointed Professor Pandectarum in 1610. Between 
1614 and 1635 he served as rector of the university seven times. In 1635 he publicly 
announced his conversion to Catholicism although he had taken this step privately 
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five years earlier.  Until this point, his Thesaurus Practicus in particular and his wide 
range of legal learning had made him a major authority in this area. Besold received 
and propagated the maiestas realis – personalis division to fit empirical reality with 
Bodin‘s terminology.54 In his publications during the 1620s, Besold referred to the 
late medieval mystic Johannes Tauler (ca 1300-1361) and to the Lutheran Johann 
Arndt, who was severely criticized by Lutheran clergy as dogmatically unsound.
55
 
Besold himself was twice, in 1622 and 1626, charged with being unsound in faith, but 
weathered both allegations. In 1628 and 1629 he wrote statements on the issue of the 
restitution of Catholic monasteries in Württemberg, a pressing issue in light of the 
1629 Edict of Restitution promulgated by Emperor Ferdinand II in the wake of early 
Catholic victories in the war.
56
 As Württemberg had been occupied by Charles V from 
1548 to 1552 and its ecclesiastical lands and institutions had been recaptured for the 
Church of Rome, it had secularized them again after 1552, and thus could be seen as 
in violation of both the Treaties of Passau and Augsburg. Christoph Besold 
exasperated his prince by arguing that if Catholics had to accept that the capture of 
their property up until August 1552 was legalized by the Treaty of Augsburg, whether 
legitimate or not, then the recapture of any piece of property seized after August 1552 
had also to be accepted by Lutherans.  Thus the preaching of the gospel by Luther and 
his adherents and the necessary consequences for reforming a corrupt church—by 
sequestration of further property of the Church of Rome in the areas of Protestant 
control—was described by him as a process devoid of inherent, i.e. religious, 
legitimacy and made legal only by the force of circumstances in 1555.
57
  
 Besold‘s statements on the notion of territory and religious freedom in the 
1620s show how variable the framework of the emerging territorial state and in 
particular the legal interpretation of cuius regio, eius religio actually remained. Besold 
Opmerking [HL6]: Ok?  You had 
converted. 
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acknowledged various meanings of the term territorium but emphasized one of them 
in particular:  the territory as jurisdictional district in which a magistrate, lawfully 
instituted, exercised the territorial law (jus terrendi).
58
 But in Public Treasure (1619), 
Besold himself continued to distinguish between physical location within a 
geographical area acknowledged to be in possession of a prince (in eines Fürsten 
Land/in territorio) and actual subjection to that prince (unter eines Fürsten 
Landsobrigkeit/de territorio), with the fact of an oath of allegiance (Erbhuldigung) 
being the major source of evidence.
59
 Thus, he did not support the notion upheld by 
many princes‘ lawyers, including a number of his colleagues in the service of the 
Duke of Württemberg on the issue of the monasteries, that physical location within a 
territory automatically renders a person subject to a prince. Nor did he agree that 
princes could break the law in an emergency situation. In his 1620 Politicorum libri 
duo, he insisted that violation of the principles of nature constituted tyranny.
60
 He 
distinguished maiestas realis—exercised by the Imperial diet—and maiestas 
personalis—exercised by the elected king—and referred to monarchomachs such as 
Althusius and Danaeus in arguing that the original source of authority remained the 
corporate people.
61
 The political unit as a whole, understood according to Roman law 
as universitas or the legal (fictitious) person of the corporate people, acting through its 
magistrates, had a right to prevent damage to its laws and properties and to defend 
itself to this end.
62
 This unit is addressed here as territorium. In his account of 
territorial law, magistrates are explained to be syndici or procurators administering the 
rights and possessions of the corporate body in question.
63
 While this defence 
appertains only to the lawful magistrate, the prince remains subordinated to the 
republic whose majesty he administers. His subjects do have a right to resist at least in 
matters of religion, referring to the father of Lutheran orthodoxy, Johann Gerhard.
64
  
Opmerking [HL7]: For the sake of 
consistency, I would prefer sticking with the 
Latin titles. 
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 In his 1626 Praecognita politices, Besold defined several objectives of the 
state, among them, of course, control of religion. With references to Johann von 
Staupitz, Valentin Weigel and Johann Arndt, and with an emphasis on piety, Besold 
took not an anti-confessional but a decidedly non-confessional stance. At the core of 
this religion was the belief that God became human and that Christ died for us.
65
  His 
Law of Majesty was based on these other arguments but added an emphasis on the 
law of nature to provide a general fundamental law protecting the exercise of religion 
as it must be granted in a legitimate order.  Besold distinguished, as was common, the 
primary law of nature (procreation, self-defence) and the secondary law of nature, the 
law of peoples (ius gentium). Intelligible by reason, this also included the duty of 
obedience to fatherland and parents (pietas in patriam et patres) – but that held true 
not only for the subjects, but also for the prince. The famous passage in I Samuel 8, 
describing wide-ranging powers for kings and used for arguments in favour of 
absolutism, was thus understood with reference to Melanchthon and to Johann 
Gerhard as a description of tyranny.
66
 Further, Besold reminded the reader that Christ 
and the apostles did not proselytize with force, that the church must be without 
weapons, and that superiors must not compel any belief—not even the Christian 
one—on their subjects. He cited Luther that those who had the honour of being 
Christians were not God‘s true people, but that God‘s true people were those who 
were prosecuted for heresy. He underpinned this approach with the stunning 
allegation that the law of nature, under which all government remained, demanded 
freedom of conscience and that every subject could believe what he wanted.
67
 He 
pointed to Moscow and the Netherlands as examples of the productivity of broad 
toleration.
68
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Conclusion 
Besold‘s use of the term territorium as a universitas under the law bound magistrates 
to legal procedure. His use of the term religion, essentially reduced to natural religion, 
restrained the legal enforcement of religion even under the Peace of Augsburg, which 
Besold did not wish to undermine, to a bare minimum. Bound to legal procedure, 
restrained by the rights of estates and subjects to defend their property and litigate 
against illegal encroachments by princes, and limited by Besold‘s curious approach to 
the meaning of religion, cuius regio, eius religio still left the princes with the ius 
reformandi, but in a very restricted sense. There is ample evidence that subjects and 
estates did refer to Besold when suing their princes.
69
 
 None of this contradicts the evidence on prosecution, in particular prosecution 
under the Counter Reformation during the first two thirds of the seventeenth century 
in Austria, Bohemia, the Upper Palatinate and elsewhere. But we should make a more 
determined effort to distinguish specific princely and confessional politics, for 
instance by the Habsburgs, from the controversial process of territorial state formation 
as such. Territorial estates did successfully struggle for confirmation of their 
privileges, referring in their cases to legal scholars such as Besold and Althusius. 
Writers like Samuel Treuer could well adopt natural law and arguments from Locke 
on legal cases of territorial estates against their princes, as in the Mecklenburg affair.
70
 
To be sure, nowhere do we find claims here for the active political participation of 
mere subjects. But the claim of Leonard Krieger made half a century ago about the 
peculiar nature of ―German freedom‖ is perhaps in need of revision.71 Significant 
sections of Lutheran jurisprudence did build, under the specific circumstances of the 
Empire, a strong case for the legal protection of subjects and estates, not least with 
regard to their consciences. With regard to the accumulation of territories, the Empire 
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was possibly more varied and remains less well understood then older accounts would 
have it. 
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